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Abstract
Using a Bayesian SVAR analysis, we document that an increase in government
purchases raises private consumption, the real wage and total factor productivity
(TFP) while reducing inflation. Each of these facts is hard to reconcile with both
neoclassical and New-Keynesian models. We extend a standard New-Keynesian
model to allow for skill accumulation through past work experience, following
Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002). An increase in government spending in-
creases hours and induces skill accumulation and higher measured TFP and real
wages in subsequent periods. Future marginal costs fall lowering future expected
inflation and, through the monetary policy rule, the real interest rate. Consumption
increases as a result.
Keywords: Fiscal policy transmission, consumption, real wage.
JEL Classification: E62, E63.
∗Antonello d’Alessandro: Bank of Italy, antonello.dalessandro@bancaditalia.it. Giulio Fella: Queen
Mary University of London, CFM, and IFS, g.fella@qmul.ac.uk. Leonardo Melosi: Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, lmelosi@frbchi.org. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the institutions they are affiliated with.
1
1 Introduction
What are the effects of changes in government spending on aggregate output? What is
the mechanism by which they propagate? Though the limitations of monetary policy
in the face of the financial crisis of 2008 have sparked a renewed interest in the role of
government spending, there is a general lack of consensus on the answer. This paper pro-
vides an empirical and theoretical analysis of the effects of government spending shocks
on consumption, TFP, the real wage and inflation. Our empirical analysis estimates a
Bayesian SVAR model on U.S. time-series for the period 1954-2007 and identifies gov-
ernment spending shocks using two distinct approaches, following respectively Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) implementation of Ramey
(2011). In line with previous empirical studies using similar methodologies and identifica-
tion strategies, we find that a positive government spending shock increases consumption,
TFP and the real wage and reduces inflation.1
With few exceptions discussed below, the observed responses of private consumption
and the real wage to innovations in government spending are hard to reconcile with the
predictions of existing models with intertemporally-optimizing consumers. these models,
the higher present value of taxes to finance the increase in government spending generates
a negative wealth effect that induces a fall in consumption and leisure and a decline the
real wage. This mechanism, which is at the heart of the real business cycle model (Baxter
and King, 1993), is powerful enough for the result to extend to New Keynesian models
with optimizing consumers. Furthermore, most theoretical models imply that inflation
increases, rather than falls, in response to a fiscal expansion.
This paper proposes a novel explanation that can account for the estimated joint
response of consumption, TFP, real wages and inflation to a government spending shock.
The key channel is the interaction of skill accumulation through past work experience—
the “learning-by-doing” (LBD) mechanism, originally proposed by Chang et al. (2002)
in an RBC framework—with wage and price rigidities. A positive shock to government
1Section 2 discusses the existing empirical literature.
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spending increases hours and, through the LBD mechanism, induces skill accumulation
and higher measured TFP and real wages in subsequent periods. For a large set of values
of the degrees of wage and price stickyness, the increase in future productivity lowers
future marginal costs and therefore the expected rate of inflation. Through the monetary
policy rule, the fall in expected inflation results in a persistent reduction in the policy
rate and the short-term real interest rate. The associated decline in the current long-term
real interest rate increases consumption.
It is worth noting that the presence of nominal rigidities is crucial to generate the co-
movement of consumption and hours in response to a shock to government spending. The
wedge (equal to the sum of the price and wage mark ups) between the consumption/leisure
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor is constant in the absence
of nominal rigidities. Since an increase in hours worked reduces the marginal product of
labor but increases the marginal rate of substitution, equilibrium requires consumption
to fall in the absence of nominal rigidities.2 Vice versa, the combination of LBD and
nominal rigidities implies that an increase in hours is accompanied by a fall in the wedge
which can be large enough to break the negative association between consumption and
hours worked.
Though it crucially relies on nominal rigidities, our mechanism is very different from
what Dupor and Li (2015) call the “expected-inflation channel” which is common to
all New-Keynesian models. According to this mechanism, an increase in government
spending results in higher expected inflation and a lower real interest, and therefore
higher consumption, if the central bank is non-responsive to inflation; i.e., if it raises the
policy rate by less than the increase in expected inflation (Eggertsson, 2011; Christiano
et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). Instead the transmission channel in our model works
through a fall in expected inflation to which the central bank responds by reducing the
policy rate and, by the Taylor principle, the real rate. In our framework, the consumption
2Bilbiie (2009) shows that, given a constant wedge, a positive co-movement between consumption and
hours in response to a government spending shock requires either consumption or leisure to be inferior
goods.
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and output response is larger the more, rather than less, responsive the central bank is to
inflation. This prediction is in line with the findings of Dupor and Li (2015) in the context
of a structural VAR that: (i) inflation responds negatively to innovations in government
spending; (ii) the response of inflation is more negative, and that of consumption positive
and larger, in periods in which the central bank responds more aggressively to inflation.
Our mechanism is also consistent with the empirical evidence in Hall and Thapar (2018)
and Jørgensen and Ravn (2018) and discussed in Section 2.2.
Our contribution is related to a relative small number of papers that also identify
mechanisms that can generate a positive response of consumption to government spending
shocks. Devereux et al. (1996) find that government spending endogenously increases
TFP, and possibly consumption and the real wage, in a real business cycle model with
increasing return to specialization. Ravn et al. (2006) show that a real business cycle
model in which consumers form consumption habits on a good-by-good basis (deep-habit)
implies a positive response of consumption and the real wage by generating a fall in price
mark-ups. Ercolani and Pavoni (2016) show that government expenditure on health
care reduces precautionary saving and increases consumption by providing insurance
against health expenditure shocks. A number of papers obtain a positive consumption
response within a New-Keynesian framework. Gal´ı et al. (2007) find that a government
expenditure shock increases aggregate consumption in an economy with a sufficiently large
share of hand-to-mouth (non-optimizing) consumers and a sufficiently pro-cyclical, non-
competitive, real wage. Corsetti et al. (2012) show that consumption responds positively
to a government expenditure shock if the latter is partly financed by future spending
reductions. Monacelli and Perotti (2008) find that, if preferences display a sufficiently
small wealth effect on labor supply, consumption and leisure are complements and price
rigidity implies a positive response of the real wage and consumption to a government
expenditure shock. Gnocchi et al. (2016) show how allowing for home production implies
a positive consumption response to government spending by generating complementarity
between consumption and leisure without imposing a low wealth effect. Christiano et al.
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(2011) find that consumption responds positively to a government spending shock when
the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is binding. Finally, Rendahl
(2016) shows that, at the zero lower bound, an increase in government spending increases
consumption, but reduces the real wage, in an economy with a frictional labor market
and rigid nominal wages.
With the exception of Devereux et al. (1996), though, all the above papers, imply
that the increase in hours induced by an increase in non-productive government spending
does not affect TFP and reduces aggregate labor productivity.3 Instead our framework
predicts that, to the extent that growth accounting does not account for workers’ skills,
the increase in labor productivity is reflected in an increase in measured TFP. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence documenting a positive response of aggregate labor
productivity (Ramey, 2011) and TFP (Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Jørgensen and Ravn,
2018) to a government spending shock.
Finally, after submitting this paper we have become aware of two very related works.
Engler and Tervala (2016) also study the implications of the same learning-by-doing
mechanism studied here in the presence of nominal rigidities. Under the assumptions
that changes in employment affect the level of productivity permanently and that the
monetary authority targets only inflation, they find that the introduction of learning-
by-doing raises the present value fiscal multiplier by a factor of 6. Jørgensen and Ravn
(2018) document the same set of stylized facts as in the present paper and show that they
can be accounted for by a model with variable technology utilization, along the lines of
Bianchi et al. (2017).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents our estimates for
the effects of government spending shocks. Section 3 introduces the model and discusses
its parameterization. Section 4 illustrates the main mechanism simulating a parsimonious
version of the model. Section 5 reports results for the full-fledged model. Section 6
3Inherently-productive government expenditure, though, always increases total factor productivity
and, possibly, consumption and the real wage (Baxter and King, 1993; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997;
Linnemann and Schabert, 2006).
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concludes.
2 Time-series evidence
In this section, we present time-series evidence on the effects of government spending
shocks using a structural vector autoregression approach. We conduct our empirical
analysis using U.S. data, for comparability with most of existing studies. We show below
that our findings that a positive government spending shock increases consumption, TFP
and the real wage, while reducing inflation, are robust across the identification schemes of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). We also compare
our findings to those of previous empirical studies.
We estimate a Bayesian VAR with four lags and a constant using nine variables: the
TFP measure constructed by Fernald (2012), real per-capita government spending (the
sum of government consumption and investment), non-durable consumption, investment,
GDP and government receipts4, the real wage, hours, the nominal interest rate and
inflation. All variables, except the nominal interest rate and inflation, are in logs. The
appendix describes the data in detail. Following Sims and Zha (1998), we adopt a unit-
root prior for the parameters of this empirical model with a pre-sample of four quarters.
As in Giannone et al. (2015), the five prior hyperparameters are chosen so as to maximize
the marginal likelihood.5 Data are quarterly and range from 1954:3 to 2007:4.6
4For the TFP series, we employ the real-time, quarterly series on TFP for the U.S. business sector,
adjusted for variations in factor utilization (labor effort and capital’s workweek), constructed by Fernald
(2012). As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), government spending is defined as the sum of
direct consumption and investment purchases excluding the imputed rent on government capital stock.
Government receipts include direct and indirect taxes net of transfers to businesses and individuals.
5The five hyperparameters affect each of the following: (i) the prior tightness for the autoregressive
coefficients of order one; (ii) the prior variance for the autoregressive coefficients of lags higher than one;
(iii) the weight for the priors for the variance and covariance matrix of innovations. (iv) the weight on co-
persistence prior dummy observations. It reflects the belief that when the data are stable at their initial
levels, it will tend to persist at that level. (v) Weight on own-persistence prior dummy observations. It
reflects the belief that when a variable has been stable at its initial level, it will tend to persist at that
level, regardless of the value of other variables. The prior relies on the first and the second moment of
the observable, which are computed using a pre-sample of four quarters. The prior is implemented via
dummy observations.
6The start date of the sample period is dictated by data availability, specifically for the nominal
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2.1 Identification
We denote by Xt = [At, Zt] the vector of variables in the baseline VAR, where At denotes
the log of TFP and Zt the vector of the remaining variables with government expenditure
ordered first.
We identify government spending shocks as innovations to government spending that
are: (a) contemporaneously orthogonal to TFP movements; (b) pre-determined with
respect to all other variables in Zt.
Assumption (a) addresses the findings in Ben Zeev and Pappa (2015b) that the pos-
itive response of TFP (and output) to unanticipated (defense) spending shocks in U.S.
quarterly data may be due to correlated measurement error in the two variables. They
argue that orthogonalization controls for the measurement error component from expen-
diture shock.
As far as assumption (b) is concerned, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we
assume that government spending is not affected within the quarter by innovations to
the other variables included in the VAR. The assumption—which relies on implementa-
tion lags of discretionary changes in government spending—implies that the reduced-form
residuals from the equation for government spending in the VAR are structural innova-
tions to government spending.
However, as highlighted in Ramey (2011), the timing of fiscal shocks is crucial for the
identification of their effects. The approach in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) may fail to
identify innovations to government spending to the extent that changes in government
spending are anticipated. In the spirit of Ramey (2011), we employ a second identification
strategy that controls for these anticipation effects by augmenting the baseline VAR with
a variable capturing expectations about government spending.
Specifically, we rely on the data and method proposed in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), who construct a continuous forecast series for government spending growth7 by
interest rate. The end date was chosen to exclude the 2008 financial crisis.
7Because there have been numerous data revisions in the National Income and Product Accounts
since the dates of these forecasts, forecast growth rates rather than levels are used.
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splicing the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the (Greenbook) forecast pre-
pared by the FRB staff for FOMC meetings. We augment the vector of variables Zt
in the baseline VAR with the forecast error FEGt computed as the difference between
the government spending growth forecast series and the actual, first-release, series of the
spending growth rate. Thus, the variables in the model are Xˆt = [At, FE
G
t , Zt] and an
innovation in the forecast error FEGt is interpreted as an unanticipated shock.
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2.2 Results
Figure 1 plots the estimated impulse response under Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) ap-
proach. In this and all the following figures time on the horizontal axis is measured in
quarters from the shock, the (annualized) nominal interest rate and inflation are mea-
sured as percentage-point deviations from the pre-shock level, while all other variables
are expressed in percentage deviation from their pre-shock level. The figures show the re-
sponse of the observables to a fiscal shock that raises spending by 1% of trend GDP upon
impact. Thus, the initial response of GDP may be interpreted as multiplier. For each
variable, we report the median as well as the 15th and 85th percentiles of the posterior
distribution of impulse responses.
Government spending increases significantly and persistently. The response of GDP
is around 1 on impact. It displays a persistent, hump-shaped increase in subsequent
quarters. Private consumption also shows a sizable and persistent increase, peaking at
about 0.5 per cent above its pre-shock level around 10 quarters after the shock. TFP
and the real wage also display a positive and persistent response. Finally, the response of
inflation is negative up to around 13 quarters after the shock while the nominal interest
rate also falls up to 20 quarters out.
Our findings are in line with previous empirical studies using a structural VAR
methodology and similar identification strategies. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fata´s
8The studies by Hall and Thapar (2018) and Jørgensen and Ravn (2018), discussed below, also use
a similar identification strategy.
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and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2008), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Ravn et al. (2012), Ben Zeev and
Pappa (2015a), Hall and Thapar (2018) and Jørgensen and Ravn (2018) document that
consumption responds positively to government spending shocks, while Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Perotti (2008), Pappa (2009), Hall and Thapar (2018)
and Jørgensen and Ravn (2018) report similar results for the real wage. Within this liter-
ature, the main exception is Mountford and Uhlig (2009) who find a small and short-lived
response of consumption and the real wage. Studies using an alternative, narrative, iden-
tification approach—such as Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside
et al. (2004) and Ramey (2011)—typically find that consumption and the real wage fall
during episodes of large, exogenous increases in defense spending.9 Caldara and Kamps
(2008) argue that, controlling for differences in the specification of reduced-form models,
private consumption significantly increases after a government spending shock, regardless
of the identification approach employed.
As far as productivity is concerned, our findings are consistent with the empirical
evidence in Bachmann and Sims (2012), Ramey (2011) and Jørgensen and Ravn (2018)
documenting a positive response of aggregate productivity to a government spending
shock.10 Contrary to Ben Zeev and Pappa’s (2015b) findings for defense spending shocks,
in our case the response of TFP, output and consumption to general government spending
shocks remains positive despite imposing that the shocks are orthogonal to TFP within
the quarter.
Quite interestingly, inflation falls in response to the fiscal shock. This result is very
striking because most theoretical models imply that inflation increases in response to a
fiscal expansion. This result is robust across the two identification schemes we use and
consistent with those in Edelberg et al. (1999), Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Canova and
9Compared to the VAR methodology with the standard Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification,
the narrative approach offers a convincing instrument to deal with the possibility that changes in gov-
ernment spending are anticipated. Yet, it has its own limitations. First, it can only study the effects of
a very specific class of shocks; namely shocks to defense spending. Secondly, it may capture the effect of
concomitant fiscal shocks of opposite sign. Finally, the transmission mechanism of government spending
may be impaired in times of war; e.g. by rationing, as was arguably the case during WWII (Hall, 2009).
10Nekarda and Ramey (2011) document that while the aggregate TFP response is positive, the partial
equilibrium short-run response at the (4-digit manufacturing) industry level is slightly negative.
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Pappa (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Dupor and Li (2015), Jørgensen and Ravn
(2018) and Hall and Thapar (2018).
Figure 2 reports the responses for the same series for the alternative approach in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Note that since the Greenbook/SPF forecast series
starts in 1966:Q4, the associated VAR is estimated over the period 1966:4 to 2007:4.
Overall the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Figure 1. In particular,
the responses of consumption and inflation are, respectively, positive and negative, and
statistically significant.
We have also run a number of robustness checks; namely: (a) we have replaced the
GDP deflator, our baseline measure of inflation, with the CPI; (b) we have replaced the
series of TFP with the average labor productivity; (c) we have included commodity prices.
In the interest of space, we report our results in the Online Appendix. In line with a
similar exercise conducted by Jørgensen and Ravn (2018) with a frequentist approach,
we find that inflation persistently falls in all cases. We also find that, qualitatively, the
response of consumption, the real wage, and TFP is consistent with the findings in this
section.
3 The model
In this section we present a New-Keynesian DSGE model along the lines of Smets and
Wouters (2007) augmented with the LBD mechanism proposed by Chang et al. (2002).
3.1 Model structure
Intermediate goods firms are monopolistic competitors that produce intermediate goods
using labor and capital inputs. The level of workers’ skills depend on hours worked in
the previous period. Final goods producers aggregate intermediate goods to produce a
homogeneous good that can be used for private and public consumption and investment.
Households consume and provide labor and capital services. Nominal frictions imply
10
prices and wages adjust only infrequently. Financial markets are complete.
3.1.1 Final good firms
The final good is a bundle of the j ∈ [0, 1] intermediate goods, produced using the
aggregation technology
Yt =
[ˆ 1
0
Yt (j)
1
1+λf dj
]1+λf
(1)
where Yt denotes the quantity of the final good at time t and Yt(j) the quantity of
intermediate good j.
The final good can be used for private, Ct, and government, Gt, consumption as well
as fixed investment Ft. Final good firms are price takers on both their output and input
markets. Their optimality condition yields the following demand function for intermediate
goods
Yt (j) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)− 1+λf
λf
Yt, (2)
where Pt denotes the price of the final good and Pt (j) is the price of intermediate good j.
Given constant returns, the zero profit condition together with equation (2) implies that
Pt =
[´ 1
0
Pt (j)
− 1
λf dj
]−λf
.
3.1.2 Intermediate good firms
Producers of the differentiated intermediate goods are monopolistic competitors facing
the demand schedule (2). Their production function is given by
Y (j) = Kt (j)
α (Ht(j)Xt)
1−α , (3)
where Kt (j) and Ht (j) are, respectively, the quantities of capital and worker-hours used
by firm j.
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The productivity of worker-hours increases in the skill level of the average worker
Xt, which depends on past labor supplies and is given to the individual firm. Following
Chang et al. (2002), the skill level Xt of the average worker is assumed to depend on hours
worked in the past. In particular, assuming symmetric equilibrium, its law of motion is
given by
Xt = X
ρx
t−1H
µn
t−1 0 ≤ ρx < 1, µn ≥ 0, (4)
where ρx captures the persistence of the past stock of skills and µn the impact elasticity
to hours in the previous period.
The markets for capital and labor are competitive. Hence, cost minimization implies
a common capital-labor ratio
Kt
Ht
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rt
, (5)
where Wt and Rt denote, respectively, the nominal wage and rental cost of capital. As a
result, the nominal marginal cost is also common and given by
MCt =
RαtW
1−α
t
αα (1− α)(1−α)X(1−α)t
. (6)
Following Calvo (1983) we assume that in every period a fraction ζp of firms cannot
re-optimize their price Pt (j) . The fraction (1− ζp) of firms able to re-optimize set their
price to solve
max
Pt(j)
new
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(ζpβ)
s Ξt+s (Pt (j)
new −MCt+s)Yt+s (j)
]
(7)
subject to the demand function (2). The term βsΞt+s is the stochastic discount factor
expressing the current value of one unit of money at time t+ s in terms of consumption
at time t.
In symmetric equilibrium, the law of motion for the aggregate price level is
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Pt =
[
(1− ζp) (P newt )
− 1
λf + ζpP
− 1
λf
t−1
]λf
. (8)
3.1.3 Households
Households are differentiated and indexed by l ∈ [0, 1] . They supply labor hours Ht(l)
to perfectly competitive labor contractors that bundle them into aggregate labor services
according to the function
Ht =
[ˆ 1
0
Ht(l)
1
1+λw dl
]1+λw
(9)
Profit maximization by labor contractors yields the demand for the l labor type
Ht(l) =
(
Wt(l)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Ht (10)
where Wt(l) is the unit cost of labor services of type l and Wt =
[´ 1
0
Wt(l)
− 1
λw dl
]−λw
is
the aggregate wage index.
Letting Ct(l) denote consumption of household l, its objective function is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
log (Ct+s(l)− γCt+s−1(l))− H
1+ϕ
t+s (l)
1 + ϕ
}
(11)
where γ measures household’s habit persistence in consumption and ϕ is the inverse of
the labor supply elasticity.
Households maximize lifetime utility in equation (11) subject to the dynamic budget
constraint
PtCt(l) + PtFt(l) +Bt(l) + Et[Ξt+1At+1(l)] ≤ it−1Bt−1(l) + At
+Wt(l)Ht(l) + Πt + [Rtut(l)− Pta (ut(l))]Kt−1(l)− PtTt (12)
The right-hand side of the expression (12) corresponds to the household’s income net of
the lump-sum taxes (or transfers) Tt. Total income is the sum of different components:
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interest income from zero-coupon government bonds it−1Bt−1(l), the state-contingent
payoff At from Arrow securities, labor income Wt(l)Ht(l), nominal dividends Πt from the
imperfectly competitive intermediate firms and net income [Rtut(l)− Pta (ut(l))]Kt−1(l)
from renting physical capital to intermediate firms. Following Smets and Wouters (2003)
the effective capital rented to intermediate goods producer firms is Kt(l) = ut(l)Kt−1(l),
where ut(l) is the utilization rate of installed capital chosen by households. Households
receive Rt for each effective unit of capital service supplied. However, they must pay a
cost of utilization a (ut(l)), expressed in term of the consumption good. As Christiano
et al. (2005) we assume a(·) is quadratic with a(1) = 0, a′′(1) > 0, and ut = 1 in the
symmetric, steady state equilibrium. Income can be used for consumption Ct(l) and
saving in either physical capital Ft(l), government bonds Bt(l) or a portfolio of Arrow
securities with random payoff At+1 priced with pricing kernel Ξt+1.
As in Christiano et al. (2005) capital accumulation evolves according to:
Kt(l) = (1− δ)Kt−1(l) +
[
1− S
(
Ft(l)
Ft−1(l)
)]
Ft(l) (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate, and S (·) is the quadratic cost of adjusting investment
with S (1) = S ′ (1) = 0 and S ′′ (·) > 0.
Households face Calvo-style wage setting frictions. In each period a fraction ζw of
them are unable to re-optimize their wage and set it according to the pre-determined rule
Wt(l) = (pit−1)
ιw (pi)1−ιw Wt−1(l) (14)
The fraction (1− ζw) of households able to re-optimize choose their wage to solve
max
Wnewt
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
s
{
−(Ht+s(l))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
}
(15)
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subject to (12), (10) and
Wt+s(l) =
s∏
l=1
(pi)(1−iw) (pit+l−1)
iw W newt (l) (16)
It follows that in symmetric equilibrium, the law of motion of the aggregate wage
satisfies
Wt =
{
(1− ζw) (W newt )−
1
λw + ζw
[
(pi)(1−iw) (pit−1)
iw Wt−1
]− 1
λw
}−λw
. (17)
3.1.4 Government policies
Let GDPt denote the total real flow of consumable resources
GDPt = Ct + Ft +Gt, (18)
as in Christiano et al. (2010), with gdpt being its logarithm.
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate it according to the linearized Taylor
rule
it − i = ρr(it−1 − i) + (1− ρr)
[
φp(Etpit+1 − pi) + φ∆y
4
(gdpt − gdpt−1)
]
, (19)
in Christiano et al. (2014), where ρr is the interest rate smoothing parameter. Here
it − i and Etpit+1 − pi are the deviations of, respectively, the nominal interest rate and
anticipated inflation from their (deterministic) steady state levels and (gdpt−gdpt−1) the
deviation of GDP growth from its (zero) steady state value.
Government spending is assumed to evolve according to
logGt = (1− ρg) logG+ ρg logGt−1 + εgt , (20)
where εgt
iid∼ (0, 1) , and is financed either by issuing bonds or by lump-sum taxation.
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Therefore, the government dynamic budget identity is
PtGt + it−1Bt−1 = PtTt +Bt (21)
Given lump-sum taxes, Ricardian equivalence holds and the only assumption that
taxes are required to satisfy is that their present value is consistent with solvency.
3.1.5 Goods market clearing
Aggregating the budget constraint (12) across households and combing with the govern-
ment budget constraint (21) yields the goods market clearing condition:
Yt = Ct + Ft +Gt + a (ut)Kt−1 (22)
Equation (22) states that final output is absorbed by private consumption, investment
and government spending. In addition, a fraction of final output is used to cover the
capital utilization cost.
3.2 Parameterization
This section discusses the parameter values employed for the model simulation. In what
follows we consider a log-linearized approximation of the model around the deterministic
steady state in which inflation pi = 0. Each period corresponds to a quarter.
We choose conventional values for households’ preference parameters and set the in-
verse of the elasticity of labor supply ϕ equal to 1 and the discount factor β equal to
0.995. The latter corresponds to a steady state real interest of around 2 per cent per
year. The degree of habit in consumption γ is equal to 0.75 as in Del Negro et al. (2007);
we set λf = 0.15 and λw = 0.05, implying steady-state price and wage mark-ups equal
to respectively 15 and 5 per cent. We set α to a standard value of 0.33 and the capital
depreciation rate δ to 0.025 to match an investment-output ratio of 24 per cent.
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We set ζp = 0.75 implying firms can change price on average once a year, consistent
with the results documented in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and in Bils and Klenow
(2004). The wage stickiness parameter ζw is also equal to 0.75, in line with the finding of
the most recent empirical literature.11 Following Christiano et al. (2010) we assume full
wage indexation to past inflation (ιw = 1).
We set the curvature of the investment adjustment cost S ′′ (1) equal to 14.30 following
Christiano et al. (2010). The curvature of the capital utilization cost a′′ is 0.035, which
implies, as in Smets and Wouters (2007), that in response to a 1 per cent increase in the
rental rate of capital the utilization rate rises by 0.85 per cent.
The two LBD parameters, µn and ρx, are taken from Chang et al. (2002), who esti-
mated them on the PSID. They are equal to respectively 0.111 and 0.797.
The autocorrelation coefficient for government spending ρg is set to 0.90 as in Gal´ı
et al. (2007). The steady-state share of government spending is assumed to be 0.20
corresponding to the post-war period average.
For the specification of the monetary policy rule we use values from Christiano et al.
(2014) and set φpi = 2.40, φ∆y = 0.36 and ρr = 0.85.
Table 1 summarizes the values of all parameters.
4 Illustrating the transmission mechanism in a sim-
plified model
We now simulate the model to analyze the response of quantities and prices to a shock
to government spending. Before turning to the full-fledged model described in Section 3,
we consider a simplified version of the model to illustrate the mechanisms through which
11Barattieri et al. (2010) find that on average the probability of a wage change is 18 per cent per
quarter, implying an expected duration of wage contracts of about 5.6 quarters and corresponding to a
value of ζw equal to 0.82. Gottschalk (2005) finds that the probabilities of a wage change differ between
males and females and are respectively equal to 46.3 and 53.5 per cent per year. This would imply a
value for ζw around 0.87. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2011) find a degree of downward inflexibility in
nominal wages which corresponds to a value for ζw of around 1.
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introducing LBD can bring the responses of consumption, measured TFP and real wages
to a government spending shock more in line with the data.
For the simplified version of the model, we turn off habit formation in consumption
(γ = 0) and wage indexation (ιw = 0). We also assume the monetary authority targets
only current inflation (ρr = φ∆y = 0) and that the production function for intermediate
goods does not use capital and is linear in labor (α = 0).
In what follows, small letters denote the logarithm of variables and carets denote a
variable’s log-deviation from its steady state value.
Optimal household behavior yields the standard Euler equation
ĉt = Et [ĉt+1]−
(̂
it − Et [pit+1]
)
, (23)
whereas, from firms’ first order conditions it is possible to derive the New-Keynesian
Phillips Curve
pit = βEt [pit+1] +
(1− ζp) (1− βζp)
ζp
m̂ct. (24)
Integrating forward equations (23) and (24) yields
ĉt = −Et
∞∑
s=0
(̂
it+s − pit+1+s
)
(25)
and
pit =
(1− ζp) (1− βζp)
ζp
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsm̂ct+s, (26)
where
m̂ct = ŵt − x̂t. (27)
Equation (25) states that current consumption is negatively related to the sum of
current and future short-term real interest rates. Note that by the expectation hypothesis
this sum is equal, up to a first-order approximation, to the real rate of return on a
hypothetical bond of infinite duration. Thus, the consumption dynamics is driven by
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the inter-temporal effect working through the real, long-term interest rate. A positive
government shock can increase consumption only if it reduces the long-term real rate.
However, if monetary policy follows a Taylor rule the reduction can occur only if inflation
falls below its steady state level. By equation (26) current inflation depends on the
discounted sum of the real marginal costs which, given linear technology, can only change
in response to changes in the real wage, or the stock of knowledge (equation (27)).
Figure 3 compares impulse responses to an exogenous increase in government ex-
penditure for the simplified model with (black solid line) and without (red dashed line)
LBD. The responses of the nominal interest rate and inflation are measured as annual-
ized percentage-point deviations from their steady state levels. The remaining variables
are expressed in quarterly percentage deviations from their steady state level. The TFP
panel in the figure plots the (log-) stock of skills xt which is the model counterpart of
Fernald’s (2012) measure of productivity in the data.
The increase in government spending results in an increase in the present value of
taxes to satisfy the government inter-temporal budget constraint. Since leisure and con-
sumption are normal goods, the resulting negative wealth effect induces agents to reduce
both, causing an outward shift in the labor supply curve both with and without LBD. In
both cases, TFP, is unchanged in the initial period—x̂0 = 0.
In the economy without LBD, TFP is constant in all periods and the increase in
present and future real wages raises present and future marginal costs and the rate of
inflation in equation (26). The monetary authority reacts by increasing the (nominal)
policy rate which, since the Taylor principle is satisfied, translates into an increase in
the real short-term interest rate. It follows from the expectation hypothesis that the
anticipated increase in future real short-term rates is immediately reflected in a higher
long-term real rate which, by equation (25), brings about an inter-temporal effect that
induces households to reduce consumption. The equilibrium response of the real wage
is small since it only reflects the fall in the price markup associated with the Keynesian
mechanism.
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In the economy with LBD, instead, the increase in hours worked increases the future
skill level of the labor force and, therefore, future TFP. By equation (27) the increase
in future TFP offsets, unlike in the case without LBD, the effect of the increase in real
wages on marginal costs. In our parameterization the effect is large enough to reduce
future marginal costs. It follows from equation (26) that the rate of inflation falls and
therefore, by the Taylor principle, so do the policy rate and the short-term real interest
rate. Since the fall in real short-term rates is persistent, it is reflected in a temporary fall
in the long-term real rate and, by equation (25), an associated increase in consumption.
Note, that relative to the case without LBD, the negative wealth effect is milder because
the increase in future TFP raises the present value of real wages. Thus the labor supply
curve shifts out less and the real wage increases more already in the first period.
To summarize, in the economy with LBD an exogenous increase in government ex-
penditure initially crowds in, rather than out, private consumption, boosts TFP and the
real wage, and reduces inflation. While all these responses are in line with our findings in
Section 2.2 and those of the papers we cite there (in particular Jørgensen and Ravn, 2018;
Hall and Thapar, 2018), it is worth emphasizing that the model transmission mechanism
is very different from what Dupor and Li (2015) call the “expected-inflation channel”
which is typical of all New-Keynesian models. According to this mechanism, an increase
in government spending results in higher expected inflation and a lower real interest, and
therefore higher consumption, if the central bank is non-responsive to inflation; i.e., if it
raises the policy rate by less than the increase in expected inflation (Eggertsson, 2011;
Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). Instead the transmission channel in our model
works through a fall in expected inflation to which the central bank responds by reducing
the policy rate and, by the Taylor principle, the real rate.
So far we have emphasized the role of the long-term interest rate in accounting for
the difference in response between the two economies. One may wonder the extent to
which a similar response of consumption to a government expenditure shock might apply
to the original set-up in Chang et al. (2002) featuring no nominal rigidities. To clarify
20
this point, we compare the predictions of our simplified LBD model economy with and
without nominal rigidities.
Figure 4 presents the results. The black solid lines plot the responses for the baseline
case with nominal frictions and the red dashed lines correspond to the case without
nominal frictions. The latter model cannot generate any increase in consumption. In
fact, not only does consumption initially fall, it does so much more than in the model
with nominal frictions but without LBD. To understand the economic intuition consider
the following equilibrium condition
mp̂nt = x̂t = µ̂t + ĥt + ĉt (28)
where mpnt denotes the (log) of the marginal product of labor, which, given the linear
technology, can change only if the stock of knowledge xt does. The term ht+ct is the (log)
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. The variable µt is thus
the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor,
and can be interpreted as the sum of the (log) wage and price markups. In the absence
of nominal rigidities markups are constant and µ̂t = 0. Since, the stock of knowledge
xt is a state variable, the marginal product of labor is unchanged in the initial period.
Therefore, as output and hours increase, consumption has to fall for the equilibrium
condition (28) to hold. It follows from equation (25) that the long run real interest rate
has to increase to crowd out consumption. Nominal rigidities are therefore essential for
consumption to initially increase in response to a fiscal expansion; i.e., a fall in µt is a
necessary condition for this to happen. From a different perspective, with flexible prices,
the increase in TFP does not result in a fall in marginal cost,12 as it is fully reflected in
a rise in the real wage. As a result, the key propagation mechanism from lower marginal
cost to lower inflation and real interest rates is shut down.
12Note that we do not plot the impulse response for inflation and marginal cost under flexible prices
in Figure 4 since both variables are unchanged in that case.
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5 Simulation results for the full model
We now turn to the simulation results for the complete model presented in section 3, which
allows for decreasing marginal returns to labor, capital dynamics and a more empirically
plausible monetary rule. Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to an exogenous increase
in government expenditure for the full-fledged model with (black solid line) and without
(red dashed line) LBD. Compared to the results for the simplified economy in Figure 3,
decreasing marginal returns to labor dampen the fall in the present value of marginal
costs. As a result, the fall in inflation and the policy rate is delayed. This, together with
the capital dynamics and variable capital utilization, generates a hump-shaped, as well
as larger and much more persistent, increase in consumption. The full model also implies
an increase in the level of investment stemming from the combination of higher labor
productivity and lower real interest rates.
It is worth emphasizing that these effects are strictly due to the increase in measured
TFP associated with the LBD mechanism. Absent this effect, in contrast with the em-
pirical evidence, a government spending increase would have a negative effect on labor
productivity and the real wage at all horizons and cause a counter-factual sizable fall in
private consumption.
We have also studied the robustness of our findings to alternative parameterizations.
In the interest of space, we report them in the Online Appendix. We highlight here the
main takeaways. The response of consumption, the real wage, TFP and inflation are not
significantly affected by a fall in the degree of price rigidity up to 0.25. The response of
consumption, instead, becomes negative for value of the degrees of wage rigidity below
0.5. Yet, for a degree of wage rigidity up to 0.25 the fall in consumption remains small, in
line with empirical estimates. The response of consumption remains positive or negative,
but small in absolute value, for a large range of parameters of the LBD mechanism and
of the monetary policy reaction function.
Finally, the response of consumption remains positive for the values of the government
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spending persistence parameter ρg up to 0.95. Above such value consumption falls as the
negative wealth effect associated with increased taxation more than offsets the Keynesian
mechanism underpinning our main result.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the short-run effects of fiscal policy on
economic activity. We use a structural VAR analysis to identify the effects of government
spending on output, consumption, TFP and the real wage. Consumption, TFP and the
real wage respond positively to an exogenous increase in government expenditure, while
inflation falls. This pattern of co-movement is consistent with a substantial body of
empirical evidence but poses a puzzle for both neoclassical and New-Keynesian models
with intertemporally-optimizing agents.
We show that introducing skill accumulation through work experience, in the form
of learning-by-doing as modeled by Chang et al. (2002), into a standard New-Keynesian
model a` la Smets and Wouters (2007) can generate a transmission mechanism that is
consistent with the empirical evidence. A positive shock to government spending in-
creases hours and, through the learning-by-doing mechanism, induces skill accumulation
and higher labor productivity and real wages in subsequent periods. Under parameter
configurations that are both plausible and standard in the literature, the increase in fu-
ture productivity lowers future marginal costs and therefore the expected rate of inflation.
The fall in expected inflation results in a persistent reduction in the policy rate and the
short-term real interest rates and, therefore, lowers the long-term real interest rate and
increases consumption.
Interestingly, the learning-by-doing mechanism of Chang et al. (2002) provides a
theoretic foundation for the hysteresis channel—the feedback from actual to potential
output—assumed in DeLong and Summers (2012). Within this framework, we show that
the existence of wage and price rigidities provides an important amplification mechanism.
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A potentially interesting research question is whether such mechanism provides sufficient
amplification for a debt-financed increase in government purchases to be self-financing in
the presence of distortionary taxation as is the case in DeLong and Summers (2012).
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Parameter Value Target/Source
ϕ Inverse labor supply elasticity 1 Standard value
β Discount factor 0.995 Annualized real interest rate: 2%
γ Consumption habit 0.75 Del Negro et al. (2007)
λf Price mark-up 0.15 Steady state price mark-up: 15%
λw Wage mark-up 0.05 Steady state wage mark-up: 5%
α Capital share 0.33 Standard value
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Investment output ratio: 0.24
ζp Probability of fixed price 0.75 Average price duration: 4 qrts
ζw Probability of fixed wage 0.75 Average wage duration: 4 qrts
ιw Degree of wage indexation 1 Full indexation to past inflation
S
′′
Investment adjustment cost 14.30 Christiano et al. (2010)
a′′ Capital utilization cost 0.035 Smets and Wouters (2007)
µn LBD: hours impact 0.111 Chang et al. (2002)
ρx LBD: auto-correlation 0.797 Chang et al. (2002)
ρg Auto-correlation of Gt 0.90 Gal´ı et al. (2007)
G
GDP
G/GDP ratio 0.20 Sample average
φpi Monetary rule: inflation 2.40 Christiano et al. (2014)
φ∆y Monetary rule: output growth 0.36 Christiano et al. (2014)
ρr Monetary rule: smoothing 0.85 Christiano et al. (2014)
Table 1: Parameter values used in the baseline medium-size DSGE model
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX
A Robustness
A.1 Robustness of empirical results
Our empirical analysis in Section 2 shows that a positive government expenditure shock,
as identified by our assumptions, is associated with an increase in consumption and a fall
in the real interest rate. One potential concern is that, to the extent that government
spending predominantly countercyclical, our identification strategy may actually imply
that our estimated impulse responses to the identified government spending shock may
be contaminated by the response of variables to countercyclical monetary policy.13 In
order to address the above concern, we explore here an alternative strategy which iden-
tifies government spending shocks as innovations to government spending that are: (a)
contemporaneously orthogonal to TFP movements; (b) pre-determined with respect to
all other variables in Z t; and (c) contemporaneously orthogonal to interest rate changes.
While we already use (a) and (b) for our main identification strategy, (c) is added here
to address the above concern. Figure 6 reports the impulse responses. Comparing them
to those in Figure 1 makes clear that the responses of consumption, TFP, the real wage
and inflation are qualitatively unaffected relative to the benchmark identification.
We have also assessed the robustness of our findings to alternative inflation and pro-
ductivity measures. Specifically: (a) we have replaced the GDP deflator, our baseline
measure of inflation, with the CPI; (b) we have replaced the series for TFP with the av-
erage labor productivity; (c) we have included commodity prices. For each case, we report
impulse responses for the Blanchard-Perotti identification. Figures 7 to 9 plot the set of
impulse responses. In line with a similar robustness exercise conducted by Jørgensen and
Ravn (2018) with a frequentist approach, we find that inflation persistently falls in all
cases. We also find that, qualitatively, the response of consumption, the real wage, and
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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TFP is consistent with the findings in the main section.
A.2 Robustness of model implications
This section studies the robustness of our findings in the main text to alternative param-
eterizations and functional form assumptions.
Figure 10 shows the sensitivity of consumption to the parameters capturing, respec-
tively, the impact of past hours (µn) and skill persistence (ρx) in the LBD mechanism.
The responses are reported for three different horizons: upon impact and after 4 and 16
quarters. The areas to the north-east of the yellow one contain the set of parameter value
that generate a positive consumption response, while the areas to the south-west denote
the combinations of the two parameters for which the consumption response is negative.
The dot corresponds to the estimates by Chang et al. (2002) from the PSID that we use.
The white area refers to the set of values for which the equilibrium is indeterminate.14
The figure shows that the response of consumption is positive for a reasonably large range
of values.
Figure 11 displays the response of consumption at different horizons as a function
of ρg, the parameter measuring the persistence of the government expenditure process.
The response of consumption is positive for values of ρg as large as 0.95. For higher
values the negative wealth effect of a, close to permanent, government spending shock
prevails. More interestingly, the response of consumption is increasing in ρg up to a value
of about 0.8 indicating that in that range the larger negative wealth affect associated
with a higher ρg is more than offset by the larger cumulative LBD response driven by the
more persistent Keynesian demand effect.
Figures 12 and 13 show the response of the key variables for three alternative values of
the degrees of price and wage rigidity (0.25, 0.5, 0.85) as captured by the Calvo parameters
ζp and ζw. As expected , the response of consumption and the real wage are increasing in
the degree of price and wage rigidity. Even for a low, by the literature’s standard, value
14Appendix C discusses the implications of LBD for indeterminacy.
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of ζp = 0.25 the response of the real wage is positive, with the exception of the first two
quarters. Similarly, consumption falls, though by a very small amount, in the first two
quarters but increases at all other horizons. The sign of the response of the real wage
is robust to changes in the degree of wage rigidity. On the other hand, the response of
consumption is negative at all horizons for values of ζw below 0.5. Its magnitude though
is remarkably small, and substantially smaller than in the absence of LBD (cf. Figure 5),
even for ζw = 0.25.
Figure 14 shows the response of consumption for a large range of parameter values for
the monetary policy rule in equation (19). The response is positive nearly everywhere.
Furthermore, the response is increasing in the size of φpi, the parameter controlling the
response of the policy rate to the inflation forecast. As pointed out in Dupor and Li
(2015), this result is in contrast with the standard transmission channel in New Keynesian
models but in line with their findings, in the context of a structural VAR, that the response
of consumption to a government expenditure shock is positive, and larger in periods in
which the central bank responds more aggressively to inflation.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our findings in the case of an alternative monetary
policy in which the GDP growth target in equation (19) is replaced by a target for
the GDP level. Figure 15 plots the response of the key variables for alternative values
(0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35) of the coefficient on the deviation of output from steady state, while
keeping all other parameters at their baseline value. The response of consumption is
positive for values of the output-gap coefficient below 0.25 and, though negative, remains
small in absolute value even when the coefficient equals 0.35. Figure 16 shows the response
of consumption for different combinations of inflation and output-gap coefficients in the
monetary policy rule. Again, the response of consumption is either positive or negative,
but remarkably small, for a large range of parameter combinations.
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B Model derivation
Apart from the inclusion of LBD, the model presented is a standard New-Keynesian
DSGE model as employed in Smets and Wouters (2007). In this part we list the first
order conditions, the steady state values and the set of log-linearized equations. In what
follow the symbol “˜” denotes variables expressed in real term.
B.1 First order conditions
B.1.1 Households.
Since in equilibrium all households make the same decision, the l index can be dropped.
Households’ first order conditions with respect to bond holding Bt, consumption Ct,
investment Ft, capital Kt and capital utilization ut are:
λItEt [pit+1] = βEt
[
λIt+1
]
it (29)
λIt =
1
(Ct − γCt−1) −
γβ
(Et [Ct+1]− γCt) (30)
λIt = λ
K
t
[
1− S
(
Ft
Ft−1
)
− S ′
(
Ft
Ft−1
)
Ft
Ft−1
]
+ βEt
[
λKt+1
] [
S
′
(
Et [Ft+1]
Ft
)(
Et [Ft+1]
Ft
)2]
(31)
λKt = βEt
[
λIt+1
] (
Et
[
R˜t+1ut+1
]
− a (Et [ut+1])
)
+ β (1− δ)Et
[
λKt+1
]
(32)
R˜t = a
′
(ut) (33)
where λIt ≡ Ptλ¯It and λ¯It and λKt are the multipliers associated respectively to the budget
constraint (12) and the capital evolution constraint (13).
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B.1.2 Wage setting
The first order condition for the wage setting problem described in (15) can be rearranged
as:
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
s
(XWt,sW relt W˜t
W˜t+s
)− 1+λw
λw
Ht+s
λIt+s ×{
(1 + λw)
(
XWt,sW
rel
t
W˜t
W˜t+s
)− (1+λw)ϕ
λw H
ϕ
t+s
λIt+s
−XWt,sW relt W˜t
}
= 0 (34)
where XWt,s ≡
s∏
l=1
(pi)(1−iw)(pit+l−1)iw
s∏
l=1
pit+l
and W relt ≡ W˜
new
t
W˜t
is the relative wage chosen by those
households that are allowed to re-optimize their wage respect to the level of wages at
time t. Wage evolution (17) expressed in term of relative wage became:
(
W˜t
)− 1
λw
= (1− ζw)
(
W relt W˜t
)− 1
λw
+ ζw
[
(pi)(1−iw) (pit−1)
iw
pit
W˜t−1
]− 1
λw
(35)
B.1.3 Firms.
Firms’ cost minimization problem yields the following demand for capital and labor in-
puts:
Rt = αMCt
Yt
Kt
(36)
Wt = MCt (1− α) Yt
Ht
(37)
where the j index has been dropped because input prices are given for firms and hence
inputs demand is the same across all firms. Combining the two equations above yields
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the input ratio (5). The ratio can also be expressed in real term:
Kt
Ht
=
α
1− α
W˜t
R˜t
(38)
Combining (36) and (37) together with the production function (3) yields the expres-
sion for nominal marginal costs in (6). In real terms marginal costs are:
M˜Ct =
1
αα (1− α)(1−α)
W˜
(1−α)
t R˜
α
t
X
(1−α)
t
(39)
B.1.4 Price setting.
Firms first order condition for the optimal price setting problem in (7) is:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζpβ)
s
(
λt+s
λt
)
(Xt,s)
− 1+λf
λf
{[
(1 + λf ) M˜Ct+s − P relt (Xt,s)
]}
= 0 (40)
where Xt,s =
1
s∏
l=1
pit+l
and the relative price P relt is defined as P
rel
t ≡ P
new
t
Pt
, where P newt is
the new price chosen by those firms able to re-optimize their price.
Price evolution (8) can be rewritten in terms of relative price as:
(1− ζp)
(
P relt
)− 1
λf + ζp
(
1
pit
)− 1
λf
= 1 (41)
Equation (40) and (41) can be combined to obtain the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
B.2 Equilibrium equations
The model equilibrium is defined by equations (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35),
(38), (39), (40), (41), plus the production function (3), the LBD accumulation process
(4), the capital accumulation process (13), the monetary policy rule (19), the definition
of GDP (18), the government spending process evolution (20), the goods market clearing
condition (22) and the definition of effective capital discussed in the main text.
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B.3 Steady states
Steady states values in term of fixed parameters are:
MC =
1
1 + λf
(42)
R =
1
β
− (1− δ) (43)
K
Y
= α
MC
R
(44)
F
Y
= δ
K
Y
(45)
C
Y
= 1− F
Y
− G
Y
(46)
B.4 Log-linearized model
Let lower-case variables with “̂” denoting variables in log-deviation from steady states
and where appropriate expressed in real term, the log-linearized equilibrium conditions
around steady-states levels are given by:
λ̂It = Et
[
λ̂It+1
]
+ iˆt − Et [pˆit+1] (47)
(1− γβ) (1− γ) λ̂It = −
(
1 + γ2β
)
ĉt + γĉt−1 + γβEt [ĉt+1] (48)
(1 + β) f̂t = f̂t−1 + βEt
[
f̂t+1
]
+
(
λ̂Kt − λ̂It
)
S ′′ (1)
(49)
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λ̂Kt − λ̂It = [1− β (1− δ)]Et [r̂t+1] + β (1− δ)Et
[
λ̂Kt+1 − λ̂It+1
]
−
(
iˆt − Et [pˆit+1]
)
(50)
Rr̂t = a
′′
(u) ût (51)
ŵrelt = ζwβ
{
Et
[
ŵrelt+1
]
+ Et [ŵt+1]− ŵt − iwpit + Et [pit+1]
}
+
λw (1− ζwβ)
λw + (1 + λw)ϕ
{
ϕĥt − λ̂It − ŵt
}
(52)
ŵt = iwpit−1 − pit + ŵt−1 + (1− ζw)
ζw
ŵrelt (53)
r̂t + k̂t = ĥt + ŵt (54)
m̂ct = (1− α) (ŵt − x̂t) + αr̂t (55)
pit = βEt [pit+1] +
(1− ζpβ) (1− ζp)
ζp
m̂ct (56)
ŷt = (1− α)
(
x̂t + ĥt
)
+ αk̂t (57)
x̂t = ρxx̂t−1 + µnĥt−1 (58)
k̂t = (1− δ) k̂t−1 + δ̂it (59)
ît = ρr̂it−1 + (1− ρr)
[
φpiEpit+1 +
φ∆y
4
(gd̂pt − gd̂pt−1)
]
(60)
gd̂pt =
C
Y
ĉt +
F
Y
f̂t +
G
Y
ĝt (61)
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + ε
g
t (62)
ŷt =
C
Y
ĉt +
F
Y
f̂t +R
K
Y
ût +
G
Y
ĝt (63)
k̂t = ût + k̂t−1 (64)
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C LBD and indeterminacy
The introduction of LBD impacts on the ability of the monetary authority to control
inflation expectations and, by implementing a Taylor rule, to bring about a unique and
stable equilibrium. In fact, the traditional wisdom, summarized by the Taylor rule,
requires that for any 1 per cent variation in inflation, central bankers should change
nominal interest rate by more than 1 per cent. However, in a model with LBD the
Taylor rule no longer assures the model stability and, on the contrary, can lead to the
unstable solutions represented by the white area in fig. 10. To see this point, consider
the simplified model presented in section 4 in the main text. Without loss of generality
we also assume that government is absent and there are no wage frictions. We also
assume that monetary authority targets expected inflation. This kind of model can be
summarized by the following system of equations:
ŷt = ĥt + x̂t (65)
ŷt = ĉt (66)
ĥt + ĉt = ŵt (67)
ît = φpiEt [pit+1] (68)
where equation (65) is the production function, equation (66) is the market clearing
condition, (67) states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure must be equal to real wage and (68) is a Taylor rule targeting expected inflation.
Equations (23)-(27) complete the model description. From (26) inflation can be stabilized
controlling for the level of marginal costs. Plugging (67) into (27) and combing (65) and
(66) marginal costs can be rewritten as:
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m̂ct = 2 (ĉt − x̂t) (69)
Using equation (25), equation (69) becomes:
m̂ct = −2Et
∞∑
s=0
(̂
it+s − pit+1+s
)
− 2x̂t (70)
Finally, plugging the monetary rule 68 into equation (70) yields:
m̂ct = −2Et
∞∑
s=0
(φpi − 1)pit+1+s − 2x̂t (71)
To see how the Taylor principle works, first consider a model without LBD, so that
the last term in the equation (71) disappears. Suppose the economy is hit by a shock that
increases marginal costs and inflation. In the attempt to stabilize inflation, the central
bank raises the nominal interest rate. If φpi > 1 it means that nominal interest rate
increase more than inflation. Hence, as far as inflation is above steady state, marginal
costs decline (see (71) ). In fact an increase in the real interest rate, by the Euler equation
described in (25), and considering the market clearing condition described in the equation
(66) leads to a reduction in the output, which in turn brings a reduction in the marginal
costs and hence, by equation (26), in the level of inflation. Thus, the economy reverts
to the steady state level. Now consider the case with LBD. As in the previous example
the economy is hit by a shock that increase inflation and the monetary authority reacts
by increasing the interest rate. However, the LBD mechanism adds a new element to
the story described above. A reduction in the output, leads to fall in the hours worked
and, by the LBD process, to a decrease in the level of stock of knowledge and hence,
as described in equation (71) to a pressure on the level of marginal costs. If the LBD
mechanism is strong enough, the increase in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase
in the level of inflation. In this case, inflation expectation become self-fulfilling. Central
banker is no longer able to control inflation expectation and hence the economy fluctuates
between booms a recessions.
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D Data sources
This section describes more in details the data employed in the estimation of the VAR
models.
Total Factor Productivity: Utilization-adjusted, quarterly TFP series for the U.S.
Business Sector, produced by John Fernald. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
Government spending: Government Consumption expenditures + Gross government
investment - Consumption of fixed capital, Table 3.1 lines 21, 39 and 42. Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
GDP: Gross Domestic Product, Table 1.1.5 line 1. Source : Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates. Analysis (BEA). Note:
Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Consumption: Non-durable goods +services, Table 1.1.5 lines 5 and 6. Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Investment: Gross private domestic investment + Personal consumption expenditures
of durable goods, Table 1.1.5 lines 7 and 4. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
Real Wage: Nominal wage deflated by GDP deflator. Nominal wage: Compensation
Per Hour (COMPNFB) in the Non-farm Business Sector. Source: U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Productivity and Costs. Note: Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly,
Index numbers 2009=100.
Total Government Receipts: Current receipts - Current transfer payments - Interest
payments, Table 3.1 lines 1, 22 and 27. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA); Note: Seasonally adjusted at annual rates.
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Hours: Employment×Average Weekly Hours. Employment : Civilian employment level
(CE16OV). Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Note: Seasonally
Adjusted, Quarterly, thousands. Average Weekly Hours : Nonfarm Business Sector:
Average Weekly Hours (PRS85006023). Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis. Note: Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly, Index numbers 2009=100.
Interest rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate (DFF). Source: FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of ST. Louise. Note: average of monthly figures. Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Inflation: Log differences of the Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product,
Table 1.1.9. line 1. Source : Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Note: Index
numbers, 2009=100. Seasonally adjusted.
Shocks news: For the definition of shock news see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
CPI Inflation: Log differences of Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items [CPIAUCSL], Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Commodity Price: Log of Producer Price Index for All Commodities [PPIACO].
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
All quantity variables are expressed as logs of real per capita amounts.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses to a government spending shock: sensitivity to government
spending persistence ρg.
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